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Abstract. There is growing interest in the design of pension annuities that insure against
idiosyncratic longevity risk while pooling and sharing systematic risk. This is partially
motivated by the desire to reduce capital and reserve requirements while retaining the value
of mortality credits; see for example Piggott, Valdez and Detzel (2005) or Donnelly, Guillen
and Nielsen (2014). In this paper we generalize the natural retirement income tontine
introduced by Milevsky and Salisbury (2015) by combining heterogeneous cohorts into one
pool. We engineer this scheme by allocating tontine shares at either a premium or a discount
to par based on both the age of the investor and the amount they invest. For example, a 55
year-old allocating $10, 000 to the tontine might be told to pay $200 per share and receive 50
shares, while a 75 year-old allocating $8, 000 might pay $40 per share and receive 200 shares.
They would all be mixed together into the same tontine pool and each tontine share would
have equal income rights. The current paper addresses existence and uniqueness issues and
discusses the conditions under which this scheme can be constructed equitably – which is
distinct from fairly – even though it isn’t optimal for any cohort. As such, this also gives us
the opportunity to compare and contrast various pooling schemes that have been proposed
in the literature and to differentiate between arrangements that are socially equitable, vs.
actuarially fair vs. economically optimal.
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1. Introduction
The tontine annuity – which was first promoted as a retirement income vehicle by Lorenzo
di Tonti in the year 1653 – hasn’t benefited from the best publicity over the last three and
a half centuries. Although at first tontines were used by British and French governments to
finance their wars (against each other), conventional fixed interest bonds ended up supersed-
ing them as the preferred method of deficit financing. Private sector insurance companies in
the 18th century offered tontine-like products, but they too were superseded by more familiar
guaranteed life annuities and pensions. In fact, by the early 19th century regulators in the
U.S. and the U.K. banned (a derivative product called) tontine insurance, although there
is some debate over whether the ban actually applies to the tontines envisioned by Tonti.
Legalities aside, in the words of the well-known financial writer Edward Chancellor, tontines
are “one of the most discredited financial instruments in history.” We refer the interested
reader to the book by Milevsky (2015) in which a slice of the tontine’s colorful history is
addressed. In this article our focus (and contribution) is actuarial as opposed to political or
historical.
In its purest financial form a tontine annuity can be viewed as a perpetual (i.e. infinite
maturity) bond that is purchased from an issuer by a group of investors who agree to share
periodic coupons only amongst survivors. As investors die and leave the tontine pool the
coupons or cash flows earned by those who avoid death increase (super) exponentially over
time. In theory the last remaining survivor receives all of the coupons until he or she finally
dies and the issuer’s obligations to make payments are terminated. One can alternatively
think of the tontine annuity as consisting of a portfolio of zero coupon bonds (ZCBs) with
staggered maturities or face values in which the final ZCB matures at the maximum possible
lifespan of the investors in the pool, e.g. age 125. Cash flows from maturing ZCBs are
distributed equally among survivors. From this perspective the cash-flow pattern can be
fined-tuned to any desired profile as long as its present value is equal to the amount invested
by the group. The tontine pool retains longevity risk in the sense that if people live longer
than expected their payments are reduced relative to what they might have expected at
time zero. Like other pooled schemes we will discuss – such as those described in Piggott
et. al. (2005), Stamos (2008), or Donnelly et. al. (2014) – with a retirement income tontine
there is no entity guaranteeing fixed payments for life, thus eliminating capital requirements.
We use the term retirement income tontine to differentiate our scheme from a “winner take
all” bet in which the payoff is deferred to the last survivor and to remind the reader of the
pension-like structure.
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1.1. Problems with Tontines. Over the past few centuries there has been quite a bit of
popular and scholarly criticism leveled against tontine schemes. Overall these concerns can
be placed into three broad categories.
The first concern is that tontines themselves are amoral because one immediately benefits
from someone’s death. A more refined version of this concern is that they create an incentive
for fraud, murder and other criminal activity. These critics contend that as the size of the
tontine pool shrinks the surviving members are incentivized to kill each other to gain a
bigger share of the tontine pool. This colorful perception of the tontine permeates literary
fiction and is the subject of many novels, but has no basis in reality. Most historical tontine
schemes capped or limited payouts once a small fraction (say 5 to 10 members) remained in
the pool. Despite all the fictional novels there simply is no documented evidence that the
last few survivors of a national tontine ever murdered each other. In fact, with hundreds
of people in the tontine pool the economic benefit from nefariously reducing the pool size
is minimal. The ethical concern that investors would benefit directly from death can be
dismissed outright within the actuarial community since that is the foundation of all pension
and annuity pricing. As for the concern with fraud, this indeed was a problem in the 17th
and 18th century when documenting life and death was unreliable but can also be dismissed
in the 21st century with modern record-keeping systems.
The second concern with tontine annuities relates to economic optimality and cash flow
patterns. In Lorenzo’s tontine scheme the cash paid to the group remained relatively constant
(i.e. the numerator) but the number of survivors (i.e. the denominator) declined more-than
exponentially fast over time, resulting in a rapidly increasing payout to surviving members.
This explosive profile of income is at odds with the economic desire for (stable) consumption
smoothing. It is assumed that older retired investors would want a stable or perhaps even
declining real cash-flow over time, notwithstanding concerns about health-care expenses and
inflation for the elderly. According to these critics the tontine annuity isn’t an optimal
economic contract. But this concern can also be remedied with proper product design.
There is no reason why the cash-flows to the group should be structured to remain constant
over time. As mentioned above, the ZCBs payments to the pool could decline (faster than)
exponentially at the same rate as (expected) mortality. In fact, this is the essence of Milevsky
and Salisbury (2015). To sum up, we believe the second objection can be easily overcome.1
1This argument was recently made by Professor William Sharpe in a presentation to the French Finance
Association, quoted in Milevsky (2015, pg. 164).
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The third concern is a more-subtle one and has to do with the pooling of cohorts and
the age profile of the tontine. That is the core focus on this paper. If one allows anyone
regardless of age to participate equally in the same tontine annuity pool – which we do not –
there would be an immediate transfer of wealth from the members who are expected to die
early (i.e. the old) to those who are expected to live the longest (i.e. the young). Historical
tontines – such as the one first issued by the English government in the late 17th century
– discriminated against the old in favor of the young. Thus, for example, in the earliest
English tontine schemes the nominees on whose life the tontine was contingent ranged in
age from a few months to over the age of 50. In equilibrium everyone should nominate the
healthiest possible age (females age 10, approximately), but that leads to design problems
when the nominee and annuitant are not the same person. If indeed one requires homogenous
mortality pools to run a non-discriminating tontine scheme then this limits the possible size
of the pool and the efficacy of large number diversification. The 18th century tontine schemes
in which investors were placed into small tailored classes – with different payouts based on
age – suffered from reduced pooling and risk diversification. A modern day pension fund
trying to implement a tontine payout structure with a predictable cash flow would face the
same concern unless it had a very large pool of willing retirees with identical ages and health
profiles.
In some sense, we believe this is the most serious criticism against resurrecting retirement
income tontines in the context of modern pension schemes. One would require hundreds of
people of exactly the same age retiring on exactly the same day, to reduce the variability of
payouts. In fact, this is one reason why authors such as Piggot, Valdez and Detzel (2005) or
Donnelly, Guillen and Nielsen (2014) have proposed pooled annuitization schemes or overlays
that allow for mixing of different cohorts over multiple generations. Note that we will not
wade into a debate over which among the many pooling schemes is better. In fact there is
quite a bit of overlap between them as we will soon demonstrate. Moreover there will be a
tradeoff. A scheme that squeezes out the highest possible utility for the group may also be
more complex to analyze and harder to explain.
In sum, we choose to analyze tontines which offer a design that provides “good” utility
while remaining sufficiently simple that we can establish a range of qualitative results. We
understand and acknowledge that other designs have their own appeal and role.
1.2. Making heterogeneous tontines equitable. As stated above, it is this third criti-
cism leveled against (retirement income) tontines that we address in the current paper. Our
remedy to this concern is to allow cohorts of different ages (and mortality) to mix in the
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same pool by allocating different participation rates or shares based on their age at the time
of purchase. For example, a 55 year-old allocating $10, 000 to the tontine might be told
to pay $200 per share and receive 50 shares, while a 75 year-old allocating $8, 000 might
pay $40 per share and receive 200 shares. They would all be mixed together into the same
tontine pool and each tontine share would have equal income rights.2
Now, it might seem rather trivial (actuarially) to allocate shares in the tontine based on
the age of the investor and the size of their investment. After all, with an immediate annuity,
$1 of lifetime income will cost a45 for a 45-year old and a75 for a 75 year-old. The relative
prices of mortality-contingent claims are well understood in the actuarial literature. But
what may not be obvious is that in fact there are situations (i.e. counter examples) in which
this cannot be done in a fair (or even equitable) manner, especially when the groups are
small. In other words, there are cases in which no mapping or share price will allow groups
to be mixed without discrimination. Our objective is to understand when this is (or is not)
possible. The need for large pools to diversify risk is linked to the issues addressed in this
paper and is a question that has recently been highlighted by Donnelly (2015) as well. We
return to this later.
As far as terminology is concerned, in this paper we are careful to distinguish between a
scheme that is fair and a scheme that is equitable, which is a somewhat weaker requirement.
A retirement income tontine scheme in which there is a possibility of everyone in the pool
dying before the maximum age and thus leaving left-overs can never be made fair, in the
sense of Donnelly (2015) unless it incorporates some form of payment to estates. By the
word fair we mean that the expected present value of income will always be less than the
amount contributed or invested into the tontine. However, a heterogeneous tontine scheme
can often (though not always) be made equitable by ensuring that the present value of income
(although less than the amount contributed) is the same for all participants in the scheme
2On a historical note, this proposal to “fix” tontines was actually made almost 200 years ago by Mr.
Charles Compton (1833), who was the Accountant General of the Royal Mail in the UK. He wrote: “His
Majesty’s Government should create a Tontine Stock bearing interest at a certain rate per annum and to
permit persons of a certain age to purchase such stock at par, those younger or older to purchase the same
stock above or below par according to their several ages.” He argued that this was preferable to forming
the contributors into classes which ends-up creating very small groups with few benefits from pooling. He
claimed that: “Younger purchasers would give more money for £100 stock than the elder and would give
up part of their income for the benefit of elder members, who in turn would bequeath their annuities to the
younger as compensation.” Compton (1833) goes on to list a table of values mapping ages into share prices,
which is quite similar (in spirit, at least) to our numbers, which we present later on in the paper.
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regardless of age. This scheme will not discriminate against any one cohort although it won’t
be fair. All of this will be addressed in detail including an analysis of scenarios in which
equity is impossible to achieve.
To recap then, in this paper we investigate how to construct a multi-age tontine scheme
and determine the proper share prices to charge participants so that it is equitable and
doesn’t discriminate against any age or any group. The tontine we propose is a closed pool
that does not allow anyone to enter (or obviously exit) after the initial set-up. This is one
further place we differ from the designs of Piggott et. al. (2005), Donnelly et. al. (2014), or
(in the tontine context) Sabin (2010). That is, we advocate closing the group to newcomers,
but allow multiple ages and contribution levels within the closed pool. Again, we refrain from
arguing that this is better or worse than any other design. That said, our model requires
and assumes little (if any) actuarial discretion as time evolves. The rules are set at time zero
and the cash-distribution algorithm is crystal clear. We believe this design has merit.
1.3. Outline. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we summa-
rize the results of Milevsky and Salisbury (2015) and the economic optimality of tontines in
the context of a single homogeneous cohort of subscribers. Indeed, there are many possi-
ble payout functions d(t) that one can use to construct a tontine scheme – historically the
d(t) curve was constant, for example 8% per year – and the optimal function depends (at a
minimum) on the representative investor’s coefficient of risk aversion. A particularly natu-
ral payout function arises as the d(t) that optimizes logarithmic utility preferences. In this
section we also offer a brief comparison to other pooling schemes. Section 3 moves from a
review of single cohorts to the introduction of multiple cohorts, which is the contribution of
the current paper. It describes in precise terms what is meant by an equitable share price for
all participants in a tontine scheme given a particular payout function d(t). In that section
we offer a more precise definition of the notion of fairness and how it differs from equitable.
Section 4 returns to the matter of economic optimality. It is typically impossible to locate
a payout function d(t) that is optimal for all cohorts, as was possible in the case of a single
cohort, even if all participants have the same level of risk aversion. Indeed, the best that
one can hope for when mixing cohorts is an equitable scheme and not a uniformly optimal
one. In Section 5 we propose that a good selection from among all the possible equitable
schemes is one in which the payout function d(t) is proportional to the expected number
of shares outstanding at any point in the future. Alas, we can’t yet prove uniqueness for
this scheme and leave this as a conjecture. We do however discuss welfare gains and losses
from the scheme and provide some numerical examples. Section 6 makes comparisons with
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other product designs that exist in the literature and discusses conditions under which they
overlap. Section 7 concludes and offers some suggestions and avenues for further research.
Proofs appear in the appendix (Section 8).
2. Annuities vs. Optimal Tontine Payout Functions
In this section we briefly review the optimal tontine scheme proposed in Milevsky and
Salisbury (2015). We assume an objective survival function tpx, for an individual aged x to
survive t years. One purpose of the tontine structure is to insulate the issuer from the risk
of a stochastic (or simply mis-specified) survival function, but in this paper we assume tpx is
given and applies to all individuals. We intend to address the stochastic case in subsequent
work. We assume that the tontine pays out continuously as opposed to quarterly or monthly.
For ease of exposition we assume a constant risk-free interest rate r, though it would be easy
to incorporate a term structure. What makes the tontine a simple and inexpensive product
to build and manage is that the payouts are known from the beginning and can be engineered
(without active management) by a simple portfolio of ZCBs.
2.1. Optimal annuities. The basic comparator for a tontine is an annuity in which annu-
itants each pay $1 to the insurer initially and receive in return an income stream of c(t) dt
for life. The constraint on these annuities is that they are fairly priced, in other words that
with a sufficiently large client base the initial payments invested at the risk-free rate will
fund the called-for payments in perpetuity. This implies a constraint on the annuity payout
function c(t), namely that
(1)
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx c(t) dt = 1.
Again, c(t) is the payout rate per survivor. The payout rate per initial dollar invested is
tpx c(t). Letting U(c) denote the instantaneous utility of consumption, a rational annuitant
(with lifetime ζ) having no bequest motive will choose a life annuity payout function for
which c(t) maximizes the discounted lifetime utility:
E[
∫ ζ
0
e−rtU(c(t)) dt] =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx U(c(t)) dt
where r is (also) the subjective discount rate (SDR), all subject to the constraint (1). Pro-
vided u is strictly concave, the following now follows from the Euler-Lagrange theorem.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 1 of Milevsky and Salisbury (2015)). Optimized life annuities have
constant c(t) ≡ 1
ax
, where ax =
∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt.
8 M.A. MILEVSKY AND T.S. SALISBURY
This result can be traced back to Yaari (1965) who showed that the optimal (retirement)
consumption profile is constant (flat) and that 100% of wealth is annuitized when there is no
bequest motive, subjective discount rates are equal to interest rates and complete annuity
markets (actuarial notes) are available.
2.2. Optimal Tontine Payouts. In practice, insurance companies funding the life annuity
c(t) are exposed to both systematic longevity risk (due to randomness or uncertainty in tpx),
model risk (the risk that tpx is mis-specified), as well as re-investment or interest rate risk
– a static bond portfolio can replicate the tontine payout over the medium term, but not
beyond 30 years. The latter is not our focus here so we will continue to assume that r is a
given constant for most of what follows.
This brings us to the tontine structure introduced in Milevsky and Salisbury (2015), in
which a predetermined dollar amount is shared among survivors at every t. Let d(t) be
the rate at which funds are paid out per initial dollar invested, a.k.a. the tontine payout
function. There is no reason for the tontine payout function to be a constant fixed percentage
of the initial dollar invested (e.g. 4% or 7%) as it was historically. Getting back to the issue
of optimality, we can pose the same question as considered above for annuities: what d(t)
is best for subscribers? The comparison is now between d(t) and tpx c(t), where c(t) is the
optimal annuity payout found above.
Suppose there are initially n subscribers to the tontine scheme, each depositing a dollar
with the tontine sponsor. Let N(t) be the random number of live subscribers at time t.
Consider one of these subscribers. Given that this individual is alive, N(t) − 1 ∼ Bin(n −
1, tpx). In other words, the number of other (live) subscribers at any time t is binomially
distributed with probability parameter tpx.
As in the Yaari (1965) model, this individual’s discounted lifetime utility is
E[
∫ ζ
0
e−rtu
(nd(t)
N(t)
)
dt] =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxE[u
(nd(t)
N(t)
)
| ζ > t] dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
tp
k
x(1− tpx)n−1−ku
(nd(t)
k + 1
)
dt.
The constraint on the tontine payout function d(t) is that the initial deposit of n should be
sufficient to sustain withdrawals in perpetuity. Of course, at some point all subscribers will
have died. So in fact the tontine sponsor will eventually be able to cease making payments,
leaving a small remainder or windfall. This gets to the issue of fairness, which we revisit in
the next section. But this final-death time is not predetermined, so we treat that profit as
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an unavoidable feature of the tontine. Remember that we do not want to expose the sponsor
to any longevity risk. It is the pool that bears this risk entirely.
Our budget or pricing constraint is therefore that
(2)
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t) dt = 1.
So, for example, if d(t) = d0 is forced to be constant, i.e. a flat tontine as was typical
historically, then the tontine payout function (rate) is simply d0 = r (or somewhat more if
a cap on permissible ages is imposed, replacing the upper bound of integration in (2) by a
value less than infinity).
The optimal d(t) is in fact far from constant. Milevsky and Salisbury (2015) find this
optimum in some generality. The following summarizes the conclusion in the case of CRRA
utility U(c) = c
1−γ
1−γ for γ > 0, γ 6= 1 (or U(c) = log c for γ = 1). Set
βn,γ(p) = p
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
pk(1− p)n−1−k
( n
k + 1
)1−γ
.
Theorem 2 (Corollary 2 of Milevsky and Salisbury (2015)). The optimal retirement income
tontine structure has d(t) = d(0)βn,γ(tpx)
1/γ, where d(0) is chosen to make (2) hold.
For an illustration of the typical such d(t), see Figure 3.
2.3. Comparing to Others. Tontines are not the only alternative to annuities that have
been investigated in the actuarial literature. Two such product designs are the group self
annuitization scheme (GSA) of Piggott, Valdez and Detzel (2005), and the optimal pooled
annuity fund (PAF) analyzed by Stamos (2008). We will describe these designs in Section
6. But for those already familiar with them we make some comparisons now, that may help
set the context for our results.
First of all, there is some degree of overlap between the three designs. In fact, for a
homogeneous pool as described above, invested in risk-free assets, it turns out that a GSA
agrees with a tontine having payout d(t) = 1
ax t
px. Following Milevsky and Salisbury (2015)
we call this design a natural tontine for the age-x cohort. That paper showed that this
design is optimal for logarithmic utility (γ = 1), since βn,1(p) = p. For heterogeneous pools
however, the GSA will not be a tontine at all, since the total payout will be random (and
path dependent), rather than deterministic (which is the defining feature of a tontine). In
the same context it turns out that the PAF which is optimal for logarithmic utility also
agrees with a natural tontine. For risk aversion γ 6= 1 in contrast, the total PAF payout will
10 M.A. MILEVSKY AND T.S. SALISBURY
be path-dependent, so again it is not a tontine. Recall that the main defining feature of the
tontine is the predictability of cash-flows (numerator) distributed to the pool.
We will make these claims precise in Section 6, but at this point we will simply content
ourselves with Table 1.
Insert Table 1 here
It compares the certainty equivalent of investments in all three products yielding the same
utility as $100 in an annuity. As must be the case, a (fairly priced) annuity provides the
highest utility, followed by the PAF, then the tontine and then the GSA. Moreover the three
agree when γ = 1. But the principal conclusion is that the three designs yield utilities that
are very similar, even with a (very) small pool of investors. If the annuity is not fairly priced,
e.g. if capital risk charges are imposed upon an annuity, in the form of a loading factor that
protects against systematic mortality risk, then any of the three designs can easily provide
higher utility to the consumer than the annuity.
Note that in Table 1 we do not include the GSA scheme for γ = 2 or 5, because in fact it
has mean utility = −∞ once γ > 2. This is an artifact of taking an infinite horizon and in the
context of a natural tontine is discussed at greater length in section A.3 of the Appendix of
Milevsky and Salisbury (2015). As indicated there, the disproportionate influence of extreme
ages could be circumvented by capping payments at some advanced age such as 110.
3. Mixing cohorts: Equitable share prices when d(t) is given
Now suppose a retirement income tontine pays out d(t) per initial dollar invested, which
may (or may not) be optimal for people of a given age. In other words, an inhomogeneous
group of individuals subscribe to purchase shares in the tontine. Each subscriber will be
entitled to a share of the total funds disbursed in proportion to the number of shares owned,
with the sole caveat that the subscriber must be alive at the time of disbursement. Once
the list of subscribers is known, together with the dollar value they will invest, they are each
quoted a price per share depending on their age and the size of their investment (and more
generally, the ages and investments of all subscribers). Of course, the price then determines
the number of shares they will receive in return for their announced investment. The issue
we wish to address is how to assign prices in an equitable manner which we will take to mean
that the expected present value of funds received by the various subscribers (per initial dollar
invested) are all equal. The mathematical question becomes whether there exists a collection
of share prices that realize this and whether such prices are unique.
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Let n be the number of subscribers. For computational purposes it will sometimes be
convenient to group them into K homogeneous cohorts (i.e. with the same age and contri-
bution level), though this is not actually a restriction since we could choose to take K = n
and deem each cohort to consist of a single individual. We will use notation that permits
grouping, but in many proofs will (without loss of generality) take cohorts to consist of single
individuals. For i = 1, . . . , K let xi be the initial age of individuals in the ith cohort, and
let wi be the number of dollars each of them invests. Let ni be the size of the ith cohort, so
n =
∑
ni and the total initial investment is w =
∑
niwi. Therefore the total time-t payouts
occur at rate wd(t). For notational convenience, we choose to base prices on participation
rates pii, in other words, 1/pii is the ith subscriber’s price per share. Let ui = piiwi be the
number of shares purchased by each individual in the ith cohort, and let u =
∑
niui be the
total number of shares purchased. Let Ni(t) be the number in the ith cohort who survive to
time t. The d(t) function satisfies the budget constraint
∫∞
0
e−rtd(t) dt = 1, where r is the
interest rate. An individual in the ith cohort who survives to time t will receive payments
at a rate of
ui × wd(t)∑
j ujNj(t)
= wd(t)
piiwi∑
j pijwjNj(t)
.
Summing this over all subscribers of course gives back a total payout rate of wd(t), as long
as at least one subscriber survives. In other words,
∑
iwd(t)Ni(t)
piiwi∑
j pijwjNj(t)
= wd(t), as
long as
∑
j pijwjNj(t) > 0.
Let ζ be the lifetime of an individual in the ith cohort. The present value of their payments
is
E
[ ∫ ζ
0
e−rtui
wd(t)∑
j ujNj(t)
dt
]
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxipiiwiE
[ wd(t)∑
j pijwjNj(t)
| ζ > 0
]
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiwd(t)Ei
[ piiwi∑
j pijwjNj(t)
]
dt.
We use the notation Ei to remind us that this is a conditional expectation, in which
Ni − 1 ∼ Bin(ni − 1, tpxi), while the other Nj ∼ Bin(nj, tpxj). Call the above expression
wiFi(pi1, . . . , piK), so if pi = (pi1, . . . , piK) then
Fi(pi) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiwd(t)Ei
[ pii∑
j pijwjNj(t)
]
dt
represents the present value of the returns per dollar invested by the ith cohort.
Subscribers in the ith cohort invest wi, so ideally, “fairness” would mean that the present
value of each person’s payments equals their initial fee, in other words, that Fi(pi) = 1 for
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each i. This is not possible, for the simple reason that there is always a positive probability
of money being left on the table once everyone dies. Let Ai,k(t) be the event that the kth
individual in the ith cohort survives till time t. Then
∑
niwi = w but∑
niwiFi(pi) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtwd(t)
∑
i
ni · tpxiEi
[ piiwi∑
j pijwjNj(t)
]
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rtwd(t)E
[∑
i
ni∑
k=1
piiwi∑
j pijwjNj(t)
1Ai,k(t)
]
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rtwd(t)E
[∑
i
piiwiNi(t)∑
j pijwjNj(t)
1{Ni(t)>0}
]
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rtwd(t)P
(∑
j
Nj(t) > 0
)
dt <
∫ ∞
0
e−rtwd(t) dt = w.
In other words, we have proved that
Lemma 3. Regardless of pi, at least one cohort must have its present value Fi(pi) < 1.
The closest we can come to being truly fair is to have all the Fi(pi) equal. In other words,
each subscriber loses the same tiny percentage of their investment, in present value terms.
We say that pi is equitable if
Fi(pi) = Fj(pi)∀i, j.
Equivalently,
Fi(pi) = 1−  for each i, where  =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)P
(∑
j
Nj(t) = 0
)
dt.
If we want to make the tontine fair in the absolute sense, we’d need to return any monies
remaining after the last death to the estates of the subscribers (as a whole, or simply to the
estate of the last survivor). This is precisely why Donnelly et. al. (2014, 2015) include a
death benefit in the products they analyze, which ensures that no money is left-over and
allows the designs to be fair. Our approach is to focus exclusively on lifetime income. In
other words, we eliminate the death benefit but keep things equitable.
Since
∑
niwi
w
Fi(pi) = 1 −  by the above argument, it is clear that either the tontine is
equitable, or there are some indices for which Fi(pi) > 1− and some for which Fi(pi) < 1−.
We call
θ(pi) = maxi 6=j|Fi(pi)− Fj(pi)|
the inequity of the tontine. We say that pi is more equitable than pi′ if θ(pi) < θ(pi′).
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There is an obstruction to equity, as the following example shows. Suppose n = K = 2.
The first subscriber will receive all the available income during the period they outlive the
second subscriber. Therefore if w
w1
is sufficiently large,
F1(pi) >
w
w1
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)tpx1 tqx2 dt >
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)[1− tqx1 tqx2 ] dt = 1− .
For example, using reasonable ages and mortality rates it is impossible to make equitable a
tontine in which one subscriber invests one dollar, and another invests a million. The most
equitable such a tontine could be is in the limiting case pi1 = 0, so that the first subscriber
only starts receiving payments once the second subscriber has died. We will address such
contingent tontines in the appendix (Section 8).
The main theorem of this paper is as follows.
Theorem 4. Fix d(t) as well as the ni, xi and wi, i = 1, . . . , K.
(a) If there exists an equitable choice of pi = (pi1, . . . , piK) such that 0 < pii <∞ for each
i, then this choice is unique up to an arbitrary multiplicative constant.
(b) A necessary and sufficient condition for such a pi to exist is the following:
(3)
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)(
∏
i/∈A
tq
ni
xi
)(1−
∏
i∈A
tq
ni
xi
) dt < αA(1− )
for every A ⊂ {1, . . . , K} with 0 < |A| < K, where αA = 1w
∑
k∈A nkwk.
We will prove this result in the appendix, where we also expand on the meaning of condition
(3). In heuristic terms: if there is a cohort who find the tontine favourable even if they have to
wait for income until all subscribers from other cohorts have died, then equity is impossible.
Note that our formulation tacitly assumed that all members of a cohort share the same
participation rate. If equitable rates exist, then this must in fact be the case. To see this,
subdivide cohort i into ni cohorts, each with a single member, and apply the uniqueness
conclusion of the above theorem.
In Section 5 we examine some plausible scenarios with utility included. Here we treat
some extreme examples to illustrate how equitable rates may vary as well as giving some
cases in which they fail to exist. We exhibit values in the two-cohort case (K = 2), using
Gompertz hazard rates, i.e. λx =
1
b
e
x−m
b at age x. Parameters are m = 88.72, b = 10, and
r = 4%. In Figure 1 we look at age disparities, and in Figure 2 we look at disparities in
investment levels.
Insert Figures 1 and 2 here.
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These figures show the spread in pi (ratio of the largest to the smallest) narrowing as the
population size increases. This is not a general rule however. If in Figure 1 we had taken
x1 = 90 and x2 = 65 the spread would narrow at first but then widen. With x1 = 65,
x2 = 85, and n1 = 1 there would be equitable rates for small values of n2 but not for large
ones. In Figure 2, the higher the outlier investment w2, the larger the size n1 of the cohort
investing w1 = $1 must be, before equitable rates exist. For example, if w2 = $20 we require
n1 ≥ 5 for equity to be possible. But w2 = $100 requires n1 ≥ 23, and w2 = $500 requires
n1 ≥ 114.
Note that equity being infeasible is not purely a phenomenon of small populations. A
poorly designed tontine can also produce this effect. For example, suppose we have two
cohorts of size n1 = n2 = 100 with ages x1 = 65 and x2 to be specified. If each member of
the second cohort contributes w2 = 1, then for a large enough value of w1 the tontine must
be inequitable. With a well designed tontine it typically takes a large value of w1 to destroy
equity. But if we take a flatter tontine than is desirable – say a tontine whose d(t) would be
natural for a population of age 50 – then quite modest values of w2 will produce inequity,
especially once there is a disparity in cohort ages. For example, if x2 = 80 (resp. 75/70/65)
then even w2 = 7 (resp. 14/37/209) will accomplish this, according to the Theorem 4
criterion.3
4. Utility, asymptotics, and optimality
4.1. Utility and loading factors. For an arbitrary tontine payout d(t) (satisfying (2) but
not necessarily optimal) and arbitrary participation rates pii (not necessarily equitable), we
may consider the utility of the cash flow received by an individual from the ith cohort.
Namely ∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiEi
[
U(
wd(t)∑
wjpijNj(t)
piiwi)
]
dt.
We are interested in the effect of inhomogeneity in the subscriber population. In particular,
we would like to understand whether adding individuals to a tontine raises or lowers util-
ity (and by how much), when the added individuals differ from the rest (in homogeneous
populations, adding individuals always increases utility). In particular, for a cohort of size
3What this all means practically speaking is that Compton’s (1833) scheme to charge different share prices
for tontine stock might not work for all ages and investment amounts. The equitable price is most definitely
not linear in the amount invested, which is in contrast to a tontine scheme with homogenous ages. And,
while one certainly can’t fault Compton (1833) for not realizing this fact, we believe it is an interesting
aspect of his rather-clever proposal.
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ni in a heterogeneous tontine with payout d(t), the natural comparison will contrast their
utility with that of an optimized tontine dˆ(t) in which only those ni homogeneous individuals
participate. Thus we define a loading factor δi, which (when applied to the homogeneous
tontine) makes the two utilities equal. In other words,
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiEi
[
u
( wd(t)∑
wjpijNj(t)
piiwi
)]
dt =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiEi
[
u
(nidˆ(t)
Ni(t)
(1− δi)wi
)]
dt.
If δi > 0 this means that the cohort loses utility from the addition of heterogeneous individu-
als to the pool. If δi < 0 then the cohort gains utility from the addition of these individuals.
For a different comparison, between tontines and annuities, see Milevsky and Salisbury
(2015), where a different loading factor is used. See also the related work by Hanewald et.
al. (2015) which examines how product loadings might affect the choice between different
mortality-contingent claims.
In Section 5, we will give numerical calculations of loadings for various choices of d(t), and
we will see that in a well-designed tontine, adding participants increases utility (i.e. loadings
are negative). We will work with γ = 1 so U(c) = log c, and the above formula simplifies
considerably. By results of Milevsky and Salisbury (2015), the optimal dˆ(t) is the tontine
that is natural for the age-xi cohort, in other words, dˆ(t) =
1
axi
tpxi .
4.2. Asymptotics and the proportional tontine. We fix K, the xi, and the wi and
consider the limit of the pii when the total number of subscribers n =
∑
ni →∞. Let αi > 0
and
∑K
i=1 αi = 1. Assume that the ni → ∞ in such a way that niwiw → αi, so αi represents
the fraction of the initial investment attributable to the ith cohort. Then
Fi(pi) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiwd(t)Ei
[ pii∑
pijwjNj(t)
]
dt.→
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)
pii · tpxi∑K
j=1 pijαj · tpxj
dt.
A particular case of this requires particular attention. Let ax =
∫∞
0
e−rttpx dt be the standard
annuity price of $1 for life for age x individuals. Consider d(t) =
∑
j
αj
axj
tpxj (which clearly
satisfies the condition that
∫∞
0
e−rtd(t) = 1). In this case, Fi(pi) → axipii, so the equitable
participation rates asymptotically become pii =
1
axi
. We call a tontine with d(t) =
∑ njwj
w
×
tpxj
axj
and pii =
1
axi
a proportional tontine, and emphasize that it is equitable only in the limit
as n→∞. In the case of a homogeneous population (i.e. K = 1), the proportional tontine
agrees with what we have earlier called the natural tontine for this cohort.
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One motivation for this particular design is that the payout rate to a surviving individual
from the ith group, at time t, is asymptotically
d(t)∑
pijαj · tpxj
pii = pii =
1
axi
per unit. In other words, the rate of payment to a surviving individual remains constant in
time, and is simply the standard annuity factor of 1
axi
per dollar of initial premium. In this
sense, a proportional tontine reproduces (in the limit) the payment structure and cost of a
standard fixed annuity for each subscriber. We will shortly see a further motivation, when
we show that it is asymptotically optimal. In Section 6 we will connect this design to the
group self-annuitization scheme (GSA).
How do our utility loadings behave when n→∞ as above? The above equation becomes
that ∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiu
( d(t)∑
pijαj · tpxj
piiwi
)
dt =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiu
( dˆ(t)
tpxi
(1− δi)wi
)
dt.
Take d(t) to be the proportional tontine, so in the limit, so pij =
1
axj
is equitable in the limit.
As above, take u to be logarithmic, and dˆ(t) to be natural for the age-xi cohort. We obtain
that ∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiu
( wi
axi
)
dt =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiu
( wi
axi
(1− δi)
)
dt,
from which we immediately get the following:
Lemma 5. Asymptotically, the proportional tontine has utility loadings δi = 0.
4.3. Can a tontine be optimal for multiple cohorts? A natural question is whether it
is possible to design a tontine to be optimal for multiple age cohorts. This turns out not
to be possible, except in the limit as n→∞. To formulate the question, we include equity
as an additional set of constraints in the optimization problem. In particular, we wish to
choose d(t) and the pij to maximize the utility of the ith cohort∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiEi
[
U(
wd(t)∑
wjpijNj(t)
piiwi)
]
dt
over d(t) ≥ 0, subject to the budget constraint ∫∞
0
e−rtd(t) dt = 1 and the equity constraints∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiwd(t)Ei
[ pii∑K
j=1 pijwjNj(t)
]
dt =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx`nd(t)E`
[ pi`∑k
j=1 KpijwjNj(t)
]
dt
for ` 6= i.
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In the limit as n→∞ we wish to maximize∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiU(
d(t)∑
αjpij · tpxj
piiwi) dt
over d(t) ≥ 0, subject to the budget constraint ∫∞
0
e−rtd(t) dt = 1 and the equity constraints∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxid(t)
pii∑K
j=1 αjpij · tpxj
dt =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpx`d(t)
pi`∑K
j=1 αjpij · tpxj
dt
for ` 6= i. This version of the problem simplifies if reformulated in terms of Γ(t) =
d(t)∑k
j=1 αjpij ·tpxj
. Now we seek to maximize
∫∞
0
e−rttpxiU(piiwiΓ(t)) dt over Γ(t) ≥ 0, sub-
ject to the budget constraint
∫∞
0
e−rtΓ(t)
∑
αjpij tpxj dt = 1 and the equity constraints∫∞
0
e−rtΓ(t)pii tpxi dt =
∫∞
0
e−rtΓ(t)pi` tpx` dt for ` 6= i.
The equity constraints become merely that
pi` = pii
∫∞
0
e−rtΓ(t) tpxi dt∫∞
0
e−rtΓ(t) tpx` dt
.
and substituting back, the budget constraint becomes that pii
∫∞
0
e−rtΓ(t) tpxi = 1. This puts
us back in the context of optimizing the simple annuity of Theorem 1, which implies that the
optimal Γ(t) is constant. If we normalize so pii =
1
axi
then the pi` =
1
ax`
, and we get Γ(t) = 1.
In particular, optimizing the utility of the ith cohort, in the presence of equity constraints,
asymptotically gives precisely the proportional tontine described in the last section, i.e.
d(t) =
∑
j
αj
axj
tpxj . Therefore this optimal tontine (in this case, really a type of annuity) has
the same design, regardless of which i one chooses to optimize for. We have shown that
Proposition 6. Assume a strictly concave utility function. In the limit as n → ∞, the
proportional tontine optimizes the utility of each cohort simultaneously.
The original optimization problem (i.e. in the setting of finite n) can also be solved, though
not so cleanly. We do not present this here, except to note that when we optimize even the
logarithmic utility of the ith cohort, the results turn out to no longer be consistent when
we vary i. In other words, it is typically impossible to make everyone happy simultaneously.
This is one reason we feel it is reasonable to first fix a tontine structure d(t) (as we have
done above), and then allow people participate at equitable rates if they so wish. Naturally,
this means one of the questions we will need to answer is how significant their utility loss is,
when doing so.
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5. Our Suggested d(t): The Natural and Equitable Tontine
In the context of a homogeneous population of age x, all investing equal amounts, the
design proposed in Milevsky and Salisbury (2015) had d(t) = 1
ax t
px, i.e. the natural tontine
for age x. In this context, the design is optimal in the case of logarithmic utility, and
near-optimal otherwise. In this section, we wish to propose a suitable generalization in the
heterogeneous setting.
For heterogeneous tontines, we have seen that overall optimality is not feasible (except
asymptotically). In that context, we propose adopting the following design, which performs
well in numerical experiments we have conducted, reduces to the above design in the case of
a homogeneous population, and agrees with the proportional tontine in the limit as n→∞
(so is optimal asymptotically).
Fix the xi, wi, and ni. We say that a tontine is natural if d(t) is at all times proportional
to the mean number of surviving tontine shares. In other words, d(t) = c
∑
ujnj · tpxj =
c
∑
pijwjnj · tpxj . Integrating, we see that
d(t) =
∑
i
[ piiniwi∑
j axjpijwjnj
]
tpxi .
Note that once the pii are given, the natural tontine is fully determined by the budget
constraint. But to construct a tontine that is both natural and equitable, we must compute
the pii and d(t) simultaneously. In practice this is more complicated than (as above) simply
fixing a d(t) and computing equitable pi’s, but not unduly so (at least when the number K
of types is small).
The following two tables (Table 2 for K = 2 cohorts, Table 3 for K = 3)
Insert Tables 2 and 3 here.
display such natural and equitable tontines, and compare them to “natural” tontines that
would have been chosen if the population had been homogeneous (but with equitable partic-
ipation rates). We also compare with the corresponding proportional tontines, though those
are not equitable. Though the theoretical basis of proportional tontines is not as appealing as
that of natural ones, they are simpler to compute, and they do appear to perform reasonably
in practice. We view them as an acceptable alternative if computational resources are not
available to work out equitable pii’s and natural d(t)’s. Note that since these tables normalize
pi to make pii = 1 for some i, this means that the proportional tontine has pij = axi/axj .
First consider Table 2. Rows labelled “A” and “D” use tontine designs that would be
natural for homogeneous populations, of age 65 and 75 respectively. Equitable pi’s are then
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computed. In row A, both δ1 and δ2 start negative (n1 = 1 = n2), meaning that the benefit of
the extra participant outweighs the impact of heterogeneity. As the common value of n1 = n2
rises, the δi become positive and defects in the design become more relevant. In particular,
loadings remain strictly positive asymptotically – while the product becomes essentially an
annuity, it is not an optimal one. Note that the loadings are not actually monotone. Adding
participants is more beneficial for older (age 75) participants than for younger (age 65) ones.
Surprisingly, in the presence of age 65 participants, even the age 75 ones get more benefit
from an age-65 design over an age-75 one.
Rows labelled “B” correspond to a truly natural and equitable design. Rows labelled “C”
are proportional designs. In most cases, either performs better for both cohorts than the
homogeneous designs do. The problem with the A design is now clear – to be equitable it
requires a higher participation rate pi2, which dilutes the benefit of adding individuals to
the tontine, and produces utility loss. In contrast, rows B and C typically show a negative
loading (i.e. a utility gain), though with different choices of parameters (not shown) this can
in fact sometimes not be the case.
Comparing B and C, it is generally the case that the older cohort prefers a natural design,
whereas the younger cohort prefers a proportional design. The proportional design comes
closer to equalizing the utility gains between the cohorts. The two designs perform similarly
asymptotically. The factor contributing most to their difference is the equitability of pi rather
than the choice of d(t) – using the proportional d(t) but equitable pi’s would turn out to give
very similar utilities to the fully natural design.
Table 3 treats the three-cohort case, comparing the natural and proportional designs with
a design that would be natural for the age-65 cohort alone. Now all three designs have very
similar effects on utility. Otherwise the table is consistent with empirical observations made
above: adding people to the tontine is generally favourable (despite heterogeneity); and the
utility improvement is greater for the older participants. Note that the good performance of
these designs may in part be a consequence of a balance between ages 60 and 70 – asymetric
designs (not shown) are less consistent.
Figure 3 shows a simulation of the payouts from a 2-cohort natural and equitable design
with n1 = 200 members and n2 = 50 members. Note that at moderate ages it comes close
to achieving a constant and steady payout to each survivor. There is higher volatility in
payments at advanced ages, once the number of survivors in the pool is small. Mitigating
that volatility would be a requirement for a practical tontine design. In fact, we believe
this is not hard to achieve, for the following reason: our tontines are designed to be optimal
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when individuals have no exogenous income. In reality there is typically some exogenous
pension income (eg. Social Security). Unpublished work by Ashraf (2015) suggests that in
the presence of exogenous income, optimal tontines should be designed to taper off and cease
payments at advanced ages (eg by age 100). If this is done, then by the time the survivor
pool is very small, any variability in its size will no longer matter.
Insert Figure 3 here.
Natural and equitable tontines appear to exist for a broad range of parameter values
(though not universally – the obstruction raised in Section 3 still remains valid). But we
have not yet succeeded in finding necessary and sufficient conditions for existence, or in
establishing uniqueness, as in Theorem 4. Therefore resolving the following remains a topic
for further research.
Conjecture 7. Fix the xi, ni, and wi, i = 1, . . . , K. Under broad conditions there will exist
a choice of pi = (pi1, . . . , piK) such that the corresponding natural tontine is equitable. Up to
an arbitrary multiplicative constant, there is at most one such pi.
6. Other product designs
As indicated earlier, there are a number of other product designs in the actuarial literature
that hedge the idiosyncratic component of longevity risk but not the systematic component.
In this section we discuss some of those alternatives.
6.1. Pooled Annuity Fund (PAF). In the homogeneous setting, the optimal PAF was
derived in Stamos (2008), and its utility (or loading in our terminology) compared to a
(variable) life annuity was investigated in Donnelly et al (2013). We are not aware of work
on such optimal PAF’s in the heterogeneous setting, though an approach like that of this
paper (i.e. fix a payout mechanism and then allocate shares equitably) could probably be
carried out in this context. PAF’s in general allow a diversified investment portfolio, but
we will consider only risk-free portfolios. In other words, this section treats PAF’s invested
purely in bonds (at rate r) with a homogeneous pool of subscribers.
A PAF allows the rate e(t, k, w) at which each individual is paid to vary with t, but
also with the number of survivors k = Nt and with the individual’s share w = Wt of total
assets under management w = W t (so W t = NtWt and w = kw). For a given risk-aversion
coefficient γ 6= 1, Stamos (2008) obtains the utility-optimizing payout rates e, and shows
that they take the form e(t, k, w) = η(t, k)w for some function η(t, k). The extra flexibility
means this provides higher utility than a tontine (where dependence on k and w is not
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allowed, other than indirectly via the initial number n of subscribers). Table 1 indeed shows
a modest improvement.
It comes at the expense of dealing with a more complex product. For example, a prospectus
would have to provide the full table of η(t, k)’s and that complexity may make it harder for
subscribers to understand (and then manage) the risks associated with the product. The
payout to an individual will no longer be predictable in terms of the current number Nt of
survivors, i.e. it will be path-dependent. A general PAF will also require the fund manager
to adjust the portfolio in response to the observed mortality experience of the pool, rather
than relying on a static bond portfolio. So there are both advantages and disadvantages to
each design.
To compare with our tontines’ payout d(t), we let e(t, k, w) denote the total payout rate,
per initial dollar invested. We assume that each individual invests $1 initially, so e(t, k, w) =
η(t, k)w/n.
An observation, that we have not seen recorded in the literature, is that when γ = 1 (in the
setting described above), the total withdrawals from the optimal PAF become deterministic.
In other words, this PAF is a tontine (and therefore must be the natural tontine):
Proposition 8. Assume a homogeneous pool, with assets invested risk-free at rate r. Assume
logarithmic utility. Then the optimal PAF has e(t, Nt,W t) =
1
ax t
px.
We give the proof in the appendix. To give a sense of the differences, Figure 3 simulates
both total payouts d(t) and e(t, Nt,W t), and individual payouts d(t)/Nt and e(t, Nt,Wt), for
γ = 5, x = 65, and a small pool of size n = 10. The utility improvement from the PAF
appears to derive from a modest reduction in the volatility of individual payouts. With a
larger pool of size n = 100, the difference in either total or individual payouts (not shown)
become negligible, except at quite advanced ages.
Insert Figures 3 and 4 here.
6.2. Group Self Annuitization (GSA). The GSA scheme was proposed in Piggott,
Valdez, and Detzel (2005). It provides a rule for managing payments from a pool of as-
sets, so does not depend on risk aversion, nor does it attempt to optimize utility. On the
other hand, it allows for a heterogeneous pool, and variable asset returns, though as in other
sections of this paper, we will focus here on the case of a fixed rate of return r.
The general GSA scheme also allows new individuals to join over at times t > 0, by valuing
each survivor’s share of current assets, and then allowing new individuals to buy in at an
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actuarially fair price. A similar approach could be used to add this feature to the tontines
considered in the current paper, but we do not pursue this idea here. We will therefore treat
only GSAs in which all investors buy-in at time 0.
A GSA scheme works as follows, in discrete time: members of the ith cohort each con-
tribute wi at time 0. This entitles them to an initial payment matching that an annuity would
provide. At later times tk, everyone’s payment is adjusted up or down by a common annuity
factor Mk chosen so that if realized mortality were to match expected mortality thereafter,
no further adjustment would be required. In symbols, survivors from the ith cohort receive
gi,k at time tk = k∆t. Initially gi,0 = wi/a˙xi where a˙x is the discrete annuity price for $1 each
period ∆t, i.e. a˙x =
∑∞
k=0 e
−rtk
tkpx. Later, gi,k = Mkgi,0 where
∑
i gi,kNi(tk)a˙xi+tk = Wk and
Wk is the wealth at time tk. The latter is determined recursively as Wk+1 = (Wk − gk)er∆t
where gk =
∑
i gi,kNi(tk) is the total disbursed at time tk.
Suppose first that all cohorts have the same age x1, but possibly different initial contri-
butions wi. Then gk =
Wk
a˙x1+tk
so the above recurrence implies that gk and Wk are both
deterministic (i.e. tontine-like). We have not seen this conclusion recorded in the litera-
ture. Moreover gk+1 =
Wk+1
a˙x1+tk+1
= Wk−gk
a˙x1+tk+1
er∆t = gk
a˙x1+tk−1
a˙x1+tk+1
er∆t. From a standard actuarial
recursion, this implies that gk+1 = gk ∆tpx1+tk , from which we obtain
Proposition 9. Assume a pool whose cohorts have the same initial age x1 and contribute
wi at time 0. Assume that assets are invested risk-free at rate r. Then the total GSA payout
is gk =
∑
njwj
a˙x1
tkpx1, while individual payouts are gi,k =
gkwi∑
j wjNj(tk)
.
If we now take limits as ∆t ↓ 0, we obtain a natural tontine (for age x1) that pays out
continuously at rate
∑
njwj
ax1
tpx1 . In the language we introduced earlier, the participation
rates for this tontine are all pii = 1, so it is not equitable (except in the homogeneous case
of a single cohort). This is consistent with the results of Donnelly (2015) who shows that
a GSA scheme is only fair in the homogeneous case. As noted earlier, to achieve fairness,
she has to include payments to estates. In this case, during the final period when anyone is
alive, all who die are deemed to receive the remaining assets distributed in the proportions
set by the GSA rules.
In the fully heterogeneous case (variability in both initial ages and initial investments),
there is no reason that either wealth or total withdrawals should be deterministic. In other
words, the GSA is no longer tontine-like. It turns out that the appropriate tontine to
compare with in this case is what we have called a proportional tontine. To start with, the
GSA payouts (resp. proportional tontine payout rates) are always proportional to the initial
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payout gi,0 =
wi
a˙xi
(resp. initial payout rate wi
axi
). In fact, any deviation between the GSA and
proportional tontine payouts derives either from the discrete-time formulation of the GSA,
or from deviations of the survival counts Ni(t) from their means – it can be shown (though
we will not give details) that if each Ni(tk) agreed with ni× tkpxi , then in the limit as ∆t ↓ 0,
the two cash flow streams would agree precisely. More concretely, as Figure 5 shows, the
actual payment streams are quite close even for small n.
Insert Figure 5 here.
6.3. Other designs. Donnelly, Guillen and Nielsen (2014) formulate another design, known
as an annuity overlay fund (AOF), as a way of pooling individual investment accounts in
order to capture mortality credits. The overlay pays out the assets of individuals who die in a
period, in proportion to all who belong to the pool at the beginning of the period (including
those who die). It does so in proportion to both the individual’s assets at risk in the pool,
and to the individual’s hazard rate.
The AOF is designed to work with arbitrary investment and withdrawal decisions by
participants, so it seeks to achieve actuarial fairness over every period, as opposed to simply
over the lifecycle. This is a very different objective than that of a tontine or annuity, whose
goal is providing stable lifetime income. We should therefore not expect the two designs to
behave similarly.
Another design is the fair transfer plan (FTP) of Sabin (2010). Only living participants re-
ceive payments. So (as in the current paper) Sabin’s goal is not actuarial fairness, but rather
to ensure that no individual has an advantage over another (i.e. what we call equitability).
On the other hand, he requires this to be achieved over every period (as in Donnelly et al
(2014)), rather than once over the lifecycle, which means that his design is not comparable
to ours. We note that he does obtain necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of
an equitable FTP, in his context.
7. Conclusion
There is a growing interest among practitioners and academics in the optimal design of
retirement de-accumulation products that insure against idiosyncratic longevity risk while
sharing aggregate exposure within a group. In this paper we investigated the design of a
retirement income tontine scheme that allows individuals with different mortality rates to
participate in the same pool. And while this scheme might not be actuarially fair, in the
sense of Donnelly (2015), this scheme is equitable in that the scheme does not discriminate
24 M.A. MILEVSKY AND T.S. SALISBURY
against any particular sub-group and all participants receive the exact same expected present
value of benefits. And although alternative designs can sometimes provide somewhat greater
utility than a tontine, the retirement income tontine has the advantage of transparency,
simplicity and requiring little if any actuarial expertise to operate. It pays a reasonably
steady and predictable cash flow to a declining group of survivors. It is also simpler to
analyze qualitatively, and leads to interesting mathematical properties and insights.
The structure we introduce in this paper – which is an extension of Milevsky and Salisbury
(2015) – allows anyone of any age to participate in the scheme by adjusting the price of a
tontine share to be a function of (i.) the number of investors, (ii.) their ages, and (iii.)
the capital they have invested. In Lorenzo Tonti’s original scheme, as well as the structure
proposed in Milevsky and Salisbury (2015), all investors (in the same pooling class) were
assumed to be of the same age and paid the same price. When smaller groups were segmented
into age bands they lost the benefit of large numbers. In this paper we have proved that it
is possible to mix cohorts without discriminating provided the diversity of the pool satisfies
certain dispersion conditions and we propose a specific design that appears to work well in
practice.
Finally, this paper provides a detailed comparison of the various mortality pooling schemes
that have been proposed in the literature as well as the conditions under which they all
collapse into a tontine-like structure. Indeed, regardless of what they are called in practice
they all do seem to share a common ancestor.
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Certainty equivalents for $100
n 10 100 10 100
γ = 0.5 γ = 1
A 101.53 100.15 102.68 100.28
B 101.55 100.15 102.68 100.28
C 101.67 100.15 102.68 100.28
γ = 2 γ = 5
A 104.62 100.53 109.20 101.22
B 104.65 100.53 109.47 101.24
Assumes r = 4% and Gompertz Mortality
(m = 88.72, b = 10). Homogeneous pool
of size n, with initial age 65.
Table 1. Shows the amount invested in three products needed to yield the
same utility as $100 invested in a life annuity guaranteed by an insurance
company. Product designs are:
A = Pooled Annuity fund, γ-optimized; Donnelly, Guillen and Nielsen (2013)
B = Tontine, γ-optimized; Milevsky and Salisbury (2015)
C = Group Self Annuitization Scheme; Piggott, Valdez and Detzel (2005)
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Equitable rates, single outlier with respect to age
size of cohort
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Figure 1. Shows the equitable participation rate pi2 versus the size n1 of
the cohort with age x1, in the presence of a single outlier (n2 = 1) with
age x2. Tontine is natural for the age x1 cohort, and each individual invests
$1 (w1 = w2 = 1). Normalized so pi1 = 1. Assumes Gompertz Mortality
(m = 88.72, b = 10) and r = 4%.
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Equitable rates, single outlier with respect to $ invested
size of cohort
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Figure 2. Shows the equitable participation rate pi2 versus the size n1 of the
cohort who invest 1 dollar (w1 = 1) each, in the presence of a single outlier
who invests w2 dollars. All subscribers are the same age (x1 = x2 = 65), and
the tontine is natural for that age. Normalized so pi1 = 1. Assumes Gompertz
Mortality (m = 88.72, b = 10) and r = 4%.
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Equitable rates and loadings in pools
with K = 2 cohorts: n1 = n2
age 65 age 75 age 65 age 75
δ1 δ2 pi2 δ1 δ2 pi2
n1 = 1 = n2 n1 = 50 = n2
A -235.4 -2604.4 1.829 239.4 30.0 1.501
B -495.0 -2819.3 1.631 -3.7 -69.8 1.375
C -1266.7 -2012.0 1.370 -20.6 -52.9 1.370
D 277.7 -2759.3 1.506 696.1 74.3 1.265
n1 = 5 = n2 n1 = 500 = n2
A 177.7 -496.8 1.550 240.0 92.8 1.495
B -69.7 -612.3 1.413 -0.22 -7.7 1.371
C -219.9 -458.7 1.370 -2.0 -5.9 1.370
D 646.5 -485.6 1.302 700.2 135.7 1.262
n1 = 10 = n2 n1 = n2 →∞
A 218.4 -213.3 1.523 239.7 100.7 1.494
B -28.9 -317.9 1.392 0 0 1.370
C -106.3 -239.5 1.370 0 0 1.370
D 676.4 -179.5 1.281 700.7 143.2 1.261
Assumes r = 4%, Gompertz Mortality (m = 88.72, b = 10);
δi are given in b.p.; Rates are normalized so pi2 = 1
Table 2. Shows the participation rates pi2 (= inverse of the share price) and
corresponding utility loadings δ1, δ2 when there are two cohorts of subscribers
in the pool: ages x1 = 65 and x2 = 75. Utility is logarithmic. Everyone invests
1 dollar (w1 = w2 = 1). Tontine designs are:
A = Natural tontine based on age 65 cohort alone, equitable rates;
B = Natural tontine based on the range of ages, equitable rates;
C = Proportional tontine;
D = Natural tontine based on age 75 cohort alone, equitable rates;
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Participation rates and utility loadings in pools
with three cohorts: 2n1 = n2 = 2n3
age 60 age 65 age 70 age 60 age 65 age 70
pi1 pi2 pi3 δ1 δ2 δ3
n1 = 5 n2 = 10 n3 = 5 n1 = 5 n2 = 10 n3 = 5
A 0.886 1 1.161 -186.9 -136.1 -594.3
B 0.884 1 1.161 -216.0 -136.6 -586.8
C 0.889 1 1.153 -275.0 -138.7 -586.8
n1 = 10 n2 = 20 n3 = 10 n1 = 10 n2 = 20 n3 = 10
A 0.889 1 1.157 -79.4 -68.9 -301.0
B 0.887 1 1.157 -102.9 -70.4 -297.2
C 0.889 1 1.153 -133.3 -71.3 -264.5
n1 = 20 n2 = 40 n3 = 20 n1 = 20 n2 = 40 n3 = 20
A 0.890 1 1.155 -29.8 -20.8 -153.3
B 0.888 1 1.155 -49.7 -23.0 -151.8
C 0.889 1 1.153 -65.4 -23.4 -135.1
Assumes r = 4% and Gompertz Mortality (m = 88.72, b = 10);
δi are given in b.p.; Rates are normalized so pi2 = 1
Table 3. Shows the participation rates pi1, pi2, pi3 (which are the inverse of the
share prices) and corresponding utility loadings δ1, δ2, δ3 when there are three
cohorts of subscribers in the pool: ages x1 = 60, x2 = 65, and x3 = 70. Utility
is logarithmic. Everyone invests 1 dollar (w1 = w2 = w3 = 1). Tontine designs
are:
A = Natural tontine based on age 65 cohort alone, equitable rates;
B = Natural tontine based on the range of ages, equitable rates;
C = Proportional tontine.
EQUITABLE RETIREMENT INCOME TONTINES 31
0 10 20 30 40
0.
00
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
0.
25
Individual payouts, natural & equitable tontine
elapsed time
pa
yo
ut
 ra
te
2nd cohort: age 85
1st cohort: age 65
Figure 3. One path of simulated individual payout rates for a natural and
equitable tontine with 2 cohorts. First cohort has n1 = 200 individuals of
age x1 = 65 and second cohort has n2 = 50 individuals of age x2 = 85. All
individuals invest 1 dollar (w1 = w2 = 1) but receive an income depending on
their group. Simulation assumes Gompertz Mortality (m = 88.72, b = 10) and
r = 4%.
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Figure 4. Shows simulated total (left) and individual (right) payout rates for
a homogeneous population consisting of 10 individuals age 65. Tontine and
PAF are both optimal for risk aversion γ = 5. Total planned tontine payout is
shown through age 110; other plots cease upon last death. Assumes Gompertz
Mortality (m = 88.72, b = 10) and r = 4%.
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Figure 5. Shows simulated total payout rate for a proportional tontine and a
GSA (with monthly payouts). Represents 2 cohorts, ages x1 = 65 and x2 = 75,
sizes n1 = n2 = 5, with all individuals investing 1 dollar (w1 = w2 = 1).
Assumes Gompertz Mortality (m = 88.72, b = 10) and r = 4%.
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8. Appendix: proofs and computations
8.1. Proof of Theorem 4. We will assume, for now, that each cohort consists of a single
individual, i.e. n = K, each ni = 1, and the Ni(t) are Bernoulli. There will be no loss of
generality in doing so, as far as the proof of uniqueness goes. To see this, simply split the
cohorts up. For existence however, an additional argument will then be needed to establish
the sufficiency of (3). In fact, a short proof of necessity could be extracted from the proof of
Lemma 13 below (see formula (7)). The more complex structure we develop below is needed
principally for sufficiency.
Let P = {(pi1, . . . , pin) : 0 < pii ≤ 1 for each i, and maxi pii = 1}. Scaling pi does not affect
the Fi, so every value of F = (F1, . . . , Fn) can be realized with some pi ∈ P . We start with
the uniqueness question.
Proof of (a) of Theorem 4. Suppose pi 6= p˜i are both equitable, and not multiples of each
other. Interpolate between them using pi(s) = spi + (1− s)p˜i. Then
d
ds
Fi(pi(s)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiwd(t)Ei
[ d
ds
pii(s)∑
j pij(s)wjNj(t)
]
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiwd(t)Ei
[∑
j[pi
′
i(s)pij(s)− pii(s)pi′j(s)]wjNj(t)
(
∑
j pij(s)wjNj(t))
2
]
dt.(4)
Moreover
pi′i(s)pij(s)− pii(s)pi′j(s) = (pii − p˜ii)
[
s(pij − p˜ij) + p˜ij
]
−
[
(s(pii − p˜ii) + p˜ii
]
(pij − p˜ij)
= (pii − p˜ii)p˜ij − (pij − p˜ij)p˜ii = piip˜ij − pijp˜ii = piipij
( p˜ij
pij
− p˜ii
pii
)
for each s ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, if we choose i to minimize p˜ii
pii
, it follows that this expression
is ≥ 0 for every j, and > 0 for some j (since p˜i is not a multiple of pi). Therefore for this
choice of i we have that d
ds
Fi(pi(s)) > 0. Thus Fi(p˜i) > Fi(pi), which is a contradiction. It
follows that uniqueness holds. 
To prove existence, and in particular to understand (3), we need to dig deeper into the
structure of the optimal pi. In particular, to consider limiting cases when some of the pii → 0.
To do that, we borrow an idea from the theory of Martin boundaries (see for example Doob
(1984)) and embed P in a compact set P0.
Set η = {1, . . . , n}. For non-empty A ⊂ η and pi ∈ P , let piA = ( piimaxj∈A pij )i∈A. Set g(pi) =
(piA)∅6=A⊂η, so g : P → [0, 1]m, where m =
∑
∅6=A⊂η |A| =
∑n
k=1 k
(
n
k
)
=
∑n−1
j=0 n
(
n−1
j
)
= n2n−1.
Let P0 be the closure of g(P) in [0, 1]m, so g is a continuous embedding of P in P0. We will
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think of P as a subset of P0, so to some extent we will use notation that identifies pi ∈ P
with g(pi) ∈ P0. In particular, we will freely use pi to denote either an element of P or an
element of P0, and in both cases will use the same notation piA for its components, as defined
above.
Let pi ∈ P0. Then piη ∈ [0, 1]n may have some (but not all) of its components = 0. Writing
piη = (piη,1, . . . , piη,n), we let A0 = {i | piη,i 6= 0}. If A0 6= η, then piη\A0 may in turn have some
(but not all) of its components = 0. Let A1 = {i ∈ η \A0 | piη\A0,i 6= 0}. Continuing this way
with piη\A0∪A1 etc., we partition η into a finite number of non-empty subsets A0, A1, . . . , AJ
such that the components of each piAj are all non-zero. Of course, if pi actually ∈ P then
A0 = η. In fact, pi may be recovered from these Aj and piAj , as the following Lemma shows.
Lemma 10. Let A ⊂ η be nonempty, and let pi ∈ P0. Define the Aj as above, and let
i = min{j|A ∩ Aj 6= ∅}. Then for k ∈ A,
piA,k =

piAi,k
maxj∈A∩Ai piAi,j
, k ∈ A ∩ Ai
0, k ∈ A \ Ai.
Proof. To see this, choose pi(m) ∈ P such that g(pi(m))→ pi. Set B = ∪j≥iAj, so A ⊂ B. For
k ∈ B, we have
piB,k = lim
m→∞
pi
(m)
B,k = limm→∞
pi
(m)
k
maxj∈B pi
(m)
j
.
By definition of piB,k, this is non-zero precisely for k ∈ Ai, so if j ∈ Ai and k ∈ B \ Ai then
pi
(m)
k
pi
(m)
j
→ 0. Therefore maxj∈A pi(m)j = maxj∈A∩Ai pi(m)j for sufficiently large m, and if k ∈ A
then
piA,k = lim
m→∞
pi
(m)
A,k = limm→∞
pi
(m)
k
maxj∈A pi
(m)
j
= lim
m→∞
pi
(m)
k
maxj∈A∩Ai pi
(m)
j
.
By the above, this = 0 if k ∈ A\Ai. If k ∈ A∩Ai we may divide numerator and denominator
by maxj∈Ai pi
(m)
j to see that it
= lim
m→∞
pi
(m)
Ai,k
maxj∈A∩Ai pi
(m)
Ai,j
=
piAi,k
maxj∈A∩Ai piAi,j
,
as required. 
What is going on in this argument is that for pi ∈ P0 and A0, A1, . . . , AJ as above, having
a sequence pi(n) ∈ P converge to pi in the topology of P0 means that the pi(m)j converge to
36 M.A. MILEVSKY AND T.S. SALISBURY
non-zero values for j ∈ A0, they converge to 0 at a common rate for j ∈ A1 (with piA1 giving
a suitably renormalized limit), they converge to 0 at a faster rate for j ∈ A2, etc.
For a given payout function d(t) we defined a tontine above, corresponding to any pi ∈ P .
We can generalize this to any pi ∈ P0. It pays only to individuals in A0, as long as any of
them survive, using participation rates pii. As soon as the last of these individuals dies, it
starts paying out to individuals in A1, using participation rates piA1,i. Once they all die, it
starts paying out to individuals in A2, using rates piA2,i, etc. Since payments are contingent
on the extinction of an earlier group, we call this generalization a contingent tontine.
If there is a contingent tontine that is favourable to the last group to start collecting, it
is quite plausible that no pi can achieve equity. The content of Theorem 4 is that these two
statements are in fact equivalent. Moreover, we shall see in the course of the proof that
equation (3) precisely captures the failure of the first statement.
We may now generalize the definition of the present value functions Fi(pi). Let pi ∈ P0,
and suppose that i ∈ Ak. Let T0 = 0, and for 1 ≤ j ≤ J + 1 let Tk be the time the last
survivor from A0 ∪ · · · ∪ Ak−1 dies. Let ζi be the lifetime of individual i. Define
(5) Fi(pi) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtwd(t)E
[ piAk,i∑
j∈Ak piAk,jwjNj(t)
1{Tk<t<ζi}
]
dt.
The point of passing to the more complicated index set P0 is the following:
Lemma 11. Each Fi : P0 → R is continuous.
Proof. Let pi ∈ P0. Suppose that pi(m) → pi. Assume to start with that each pi(m) ∈ P .
Define A0, . . . , AJ as above (using pi), and likewise T0, . . . , TJ+1, and let i ∈ A`. Set Bk =
Ak ∪ · · · ∪ AJ . Then
Fi(pi
(m)) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtwd(t)E
[ pi(m)i∑
j∈η pi
(m)
j wjNj(t)
1{t<ζi}
]
dt
=
∑
k
∫ ∞
0
e−rtwd(t)E
[ pi(m)i∑
j∈η pi
(m)
j wjNj(t)
1{Tk<t<ζi∧Tk+1}
]
dt
=
∑
k≤`
∫ ∞
0
e−rtwd(t)E
[ pi(m)i∑
j∈Bk pi
(m)
j wjNj(t)
1{Tk<t<ζi∧Tk+1}
]
dt
=
∑
k≤`
∫ ∞
0
e−rtwd(t)E
[ p˜i(m)i,k∑
j∈Bk p˜i
(m)
j,k wjNj(t)
1{Tk<t<ζi∧Tk+1}
]
dt.
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where p˜i
(m)
q,k =
pi
(m)
q
maxj∈Ak pi
(m)
j
. Now send m→∞. If j ∈ Ak then p˜i(m)j,k → piAk,j, while if j ∈ Bk+1
then p˜i
(m)
j,k → 0. In particular, dominated convergence implies that the terms with k < `
vanish in the limit, while the k = ` term converges to to Fi(pi).
The general case now follows. If pi(m) → pi but we no longer assume pi(m) ∈ P , simply
choose p˜i(m) ∈ P such that |Fi(pi(m))−Fi(p˜i(m))| → 0 and ‖pi(m)− p˜i(m)‖ → 0. Then p˜i(m) → pi
so limFi(pi
(m)) = limFi(p˜i
(m)) = Fi(pi). 
Define a very equitable participation rate to be any pi ∈ P0 that minimizes θ0(pi) =
maxi,k |Fi(pi) − Fk(pi)| over pi ∈ P0. By Lemma 11 and compactness of P0, such a pi ex-
ists. Of course, pi is equitable if and only if θ0(pi) = 0 and pi ∈ P .
Lemma 12. Let pi be very equitable. Let a0 = mini∈η Fi(pi), and aJ = maxi∈η Fi(pi). Then
Fi(pi) = a0 for every i ∈ A0, and Fi(pi) = aJ for every i ∈ AJ .
Proof. Let pi be very equitable. As in the proof of uniqueness, we will perturb pi to improve
equity. Fix j. Let A˜ consist of the i ∈ Aj which minimize Fi(pi) over Aj, and set
piAj ,i(s) =
piAj ,i(1 + s), i ∈ A˜piAj ,i, i ∈ Aj \ A˜.
We do not perturb piAk,q for any k 6= j, so there is no impact on Fq for q /∈ Aj. Note that
this pi(s) may not lie ∈ P0, as maxi∈Aj piAj ,i(s) may now be 6= 1. This will not turn out to
matter, and could in any case be remedied by rescaling at a suitable point in the argument.
A calculation as in (4) shows that for i ∈ Aj,
d
ds
Fi(pi(s)) =∫ ∞
0
e−rttpxiwd(t)E
[∑
k∈Aj [pi
′
Aj ,i
(s)piAj ,k(s)− piAj ,i(s)pi′Aj ,k(s)]wkNk(t)
(
∑
k∈Aj piAj ,k(s)wkNk(t))
2
1{Tk<t<ζi∧Tk+1}
]
dt.
Assume that A˜ 6= Aj, i.e. that Fi(pi) is not constant on Aj. I claim that
d
ds
Fi(pi(s)) is
> 0, i ∈ A˜< 0, i ∈ Aj \ A˜.
In other words, this perturbation brings the lowest Fi’s up, and the other Fi’s down.
Suppose i ∈ A˜. If k ∈ A˜ then pi′Aj ,i(s)piAj ,k(s)−piAj ,i(s)pi′Aj ,k(s) = piAj ,ipiAj ,k−piAj ,ipiAj ,k = 0.
If k ∈ Aj \ A˜ then pi′Aj ,i(s)piAj ,k(s) − piAj ,i(s)pi′Aj ,k(s) = piAj ,ipiAj ,k > 0. Therefore the sum is
> 0 so d
ds
Fi(pi(s)) > 0 too.
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Now suppose i ∈ Aj \A˜. If k ∈ A˜ then pi′Aj ,i(s)piAj ,k(s)−piAj ,i(s)pi′Aj ,k(s) = −piAj ,ipiAj ,k < 0.
If k /∈ A then pi′Aj ,i(s)piAj ,k(s)−piAj ,i(s)pi′Aj ,k(s) = 0. Therefore the sum is < 0 so ddsFi(pi(s)) <
0 too.
The result of this calculation is that for small s, our perturbation reduces the variation of
Fi(pi) on Aj, unless i 7→ Fi(pi) is already constant on Aj.
Turning to the statement of the lemma, there must be a j such that Fi(pi) = a0 for every
i ∈ Aj, otherwise we could perturb so as to raise every Fi(pi) which equals a0, while lowering
or not changing the other Fk(pi). (If necessary, rescale to keep pi ∈ P0.) This would reduce
θ0(pi) which is impossible. By the same perturbation, we may also assume that for any j,
either Fi(pi) = a0 for every i ∈ Aj, or Fi(pi) > a0 for every i ∈ Aj. Let J0 be the set of j of
the former type. Our goal is to show that 0 ∈ J0.
Suppose that j ≥ 1 belongs to J0, but j−1 does not. Consider the following perturbation.
Combine Aj−1 and Aj, by setting
piAj−1∪Aj ,i(s) =
piAj−1,i, i ∈ Aj−1spiAj ,i, i ∈ Aj
for s > 0. This will not impact Fi(pi(s)) for i other than j−1 or j. For i ∈ Aj this has no effect
on the expectation in (5) representing payments after time Tj, but with positive probability
it adds a non-zero contribution from the integral over [Tj−1, Tj). Therefore Fi(pi(s)) increases
for each i ∈ Aj. A derivative calculation similar to that given above shows that the Fi(pi(s))
decrease for i ∈ Aj−1.
This perturbation may or may not decrease θ0(pi). But if 0 /∈ J0 then we may apply it in
turn to the first j in J0, then the second j in J0, etc., until eventually θ0(pi) will decrease.
This would be a contradiction, so it follows that 0 ∈ J0.
We may apply a similar argument to aJ to prove the remaining conclusions. 
We are now ready to prove the existence portion of Theorem 4, under our additional
restriction that n = K. For A ⊂ η, let αA = 1w
∑
i∈Awi be the percentage of the total initial
investment contributed by members of A.
Lemma 13. Fix d(t) as well as the xi and wi, and assume that each cohort consists of a
single individual. For there to exist a choice of pi ∈ P with Fi(pi) = 1 −  for each i, it is
necessary and sufficient that for every A ⊂ η with ∅ 6= A 6= η we have
(6)
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)(
∏
i/∈A
tqxi)(1−
∏
i∈A
tqxi) dt < αA(1− ).
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We may think of (6) failing for one of two reasons – the presence of particularly elderly
individuals, or of individuals who contribute a disproportionately large fraction of the initial
investment. In either case, we let A consist of the remaining people (younger, or investing
less). Condition (6) will fail if either
∏
i/∈A tqxi is large (i.e. the A
c individuals all die early
into the tontine), or if αA is small (i.e. the A
c individuals over-invest). A well-designed
d(t) will attempt to mitigate these possibilities, though we have seen that this is not always
possible. In particular, if we fix a choice of d(t) but allow the wi to vary, there will always
be a choice for the wi that makes one of the αA small enough to force (6) to fail.
Proof. Assume (6), and let pi ∈ P0 be very equitable. Let the aJ be as in Lemma 12. By
Lemma 12 we have aJ ≥ 1− , since a suitably weighted average of the Fi(pi) equals 1− .
Suppose that there is no equitable pi, or that the equitable pi belongs to P0 \P . Then J > 0,
so 0 < |AJ | < n. Moreover
(1− )αAJ ≤
∑
i∈AJ
wi
w
Fi(pi) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)
∑
i∈AJ
E
[ piAJ ,iwi∑
k∈AJ piAJ ,kwkNk(t)
1{TAJ≤t<ζi}
]
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)E
[∑
i∈AJ
piAJ ,iwiNi(t)∑
k∈AJ piAJ ,kwkNk(t)
1{Ni(t)6=0,TAJ≤t}
]
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)P
(∑
i
Ni(t) > 0, TAJ ≤ t
)
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)(
∏
i/∈AJ
tqxi)(1−
∏
i∈AJ
tqxi) dt,
which violates (6).
Conversely, suppose pi ∈ P is equitable, and let A ⊂ η be non-empty and 6= η. Then as
above,
(1− )αA =
∑
i∈A
wi
w
Fi(pi) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)E
[∑
i∈A
piiwiNi(t)∑
k∈η pikwkNk(t)
1{Ni(t) 6=0}
]
dt
>
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)P
(∑
i∈A
Ni(t) > 0,
∑
i∈η\A
Ni(t) = 0
)
dt,(7)
which shows (6). 
The problem with condition (6) of Lemma 13 is that it involves checking 2n−2 conditions.
Condition (3) brings this down to a manageable number, provided we have a modest number
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of cohorts. We therefore now abandon the assumption that n = K, in which case recall that
αA once more denotes
1
w
∑
i∈A niwi.
Proof of (b) of Theorem 4. Assume condition (3), which we may restate as
(8)
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)
∏
i/∈A
tq
ni
xi
dt < αA(1− ) + .
Condition (6) involves a general collection of subscribers, which we will take to consist of
0 ≤ ki ≤ ni individuals from the ith group, i = 1, . . . , K. Stated in this way it becomes that
(9)
∫ ∞
0
e−rtd(t)
K∏
i=1
tq
ni−ki
xi
dt < (1− )
K∑
i=1
kiwi
w
+ 
for every choice of 0 ≤ ki ≤ ni (other than (0, . . . , 0) and (n1, . . . , nK)). Observe that the
left hand side of (9) is a concave function of each ki (when the others are fixed), while the
right hand side varies in an affine way. Observe also that (8) is precisely (9) for the extreme
points of I = [0, n1]×· · ·× [0, nK ] other than (0, . . . , 0) and (n1, . . . , nK). It is easily verified
that the same inequality holds at the last two points as well, but with = rather than <.
This is enough to conclude that the strict inequality (9) holds at all points of I other than
(0, . . . , 0) and (n1, . . . , n2), so Lemma 13 applies to give an equitable pi ∈ P .
Necessity also follows from Lemma 13, since (3) is a special case of (6). 
8.2. Computational details. Motivated by the proof of Theorem 4, we calculate equitable
participation rates by successively raising those pii for which Fi(pi) < 1 − . We choose a
relaxation rate η < 1, and cycle through the i, raising pii by η as often as possible while
preserving the above criterion. Then repeat the process this time raising by η2, then repeat
again raising by η3, etc. For K = 3 this appears to converge to 5 digits accuracy, using fewer
than 100 evaluations of the vector F (pi).
Each equitable (20, 40, 20) entry of Table 3 took approximately 4 hours running under
R, and involved 100 evaluations of the vector F (pi). Each evaluation required computing
two integrals, using Simpson’s rule with 400 time steps. Each time step in turn called for a
binomial sum of n1n2n3 terms. With K = 2 the computations are faster (25 integrations,
with each time step calling for summing n1n2 terms); for example the equitable (500, 500)
entries in Table 2 each ran in just over 3 hours, despite accounting for an order of magnitude
more people. Note that our code could easily be optimized to run faster, eg. by using a
more efficient integration method, or by starting with coarser time steps and refining them
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as the iteration proceeds. For utility computations, we do seem to need the level of accuracy
provided by 400 time steps, but the pi’s are less sensitive and could have been found quicker.
8.3. Proof of Proposition 8. Let v(t, k, w) denote the utility an individual derives from a
PAF. Scale invariance shows that e(t, k, w) = η(t, k)w for some function η. When γ = 1, it
also shows that v(t, k, w) = ax+t logw+v(t, k, 1). In the case γ 6= 1, Stamos (2008) derives an
HJB equation for an individual’s utility v(t, k, w). The same argument applies when γ = 1
and shows (in our notation) that
vt(t, k, w) + λx+t(k − 1)[v(t, k − 1, w k
k − 1)− v(t, k, w)]− (r + λx+t)v(t, k, w)+
+ sup
η
[
log(ηw) + wvw(t, k, w)(r − η)
]
= 0
for k ≥ 2 (with a similar equation when k = 1, except without the second term. Optimizing
over η, and substituting our expression for v gives that ax+t = wvw(t, k, w) = 1/η. There-
fore e(t, k, w) = w
nax+t
, which is independent of k. Therefore W t evolves according to the
differential equation
dW t =
[
r − 1
ax+t
]
W t dt.
It is easily checked that the solution (with initial condition W 0 = n) is W t =
nax+t·tpx
ax
, from
which we conclude that e(t, Nt,W t) =
1
ax t
px, as required.
